LTC Bullet: Long-Term Care: The Solution (The Serial, Part 3) Friday, November 17, 2023 Seattle— LTC Comment: Today we offer easy access to a must-read new study by Center president Steve Moses, after the ***news.*** *** PODCAST: “Removing
Medicaid Loopholes to Improve Long-Term Health Care,” by AnneMarie
Schieber, The Heartland Institute, 11/7/2023 *** COLUMN: “The
federal Medicaid bait and switch,” by Stephen A. Moses, McKnight’s
LTC News, 11/6/2023 *** APPEAL: The Center for Long-Term Care Reform, in partnership with the Paragon Health Institute, is embarking on a campaign to improve LTC services and financing. In “Long-Term Care: The Problem,” we explained what’s wrong and why. In “Long-Term Care: The Solution,” we discard the failed policies of the past and propose a radical new approach based on engaging vast sources of private wealth currently diverted from LTC funding. We will reach out to the media, brief federal and state policy and law makers, speak at conferences, and write for publication, all toward the end of achieving the policy goals in “Long-Term Care: The Solution.” Will you help us in this effort? Join the Center or contribute online here. Check out the Center’s “Membership Levels and Benefits” schedule here. Most corporate memberships include a briefing by Center president and “LTC Solution” author Stephen Moses. Call or write for more information: 206-283-7036; damon@centerltc.com; smoses@centerltc.com. LTC policy has floundered for too long. Let’s get this done! ***
LTC BULLET: LONG-TERM CARE: THE SOLUTION (THE SERIAL, Part 3) LTC Comment: The Paragon Health Institute published “Long-Term Care: The Solution” on October 3. This new report is long and complicated, but important. So LTC Bullets will deliver it to you in bite-sized pieces over several weeks. Published so far: Long-Term Care: The Solution (The Serial), October 20, 2023 and Long-Term Care: The Solution (The Serial, Part 2), November 3, 2023. Today, read “Changing Course: From Failed Threats to Stronger Incentives,” “How to Engage the Public in Long-Term Care Planning While They Still Have Time to Prepare,” “How These Policy Changes Would Impact the LTC Market,” “People Already Have More Funds Available for LTC Than They Are Using Now,” and “Methods to Satisfy Individual LTC Responsibility.” Next time: “Poverty Reconceptualized,” “Managing the Back End,” and “Why Not Social Insurance Instead?” Finally, in Part 4, expect “Summary and Conclusion” and the “Appendix: Exactly How Much Wealth Do People Have and Why Aren’t They Using More of It for LTC?” Excerpts from “Long-Term
Care: The Solution” Changing Course: From Failed Threats to Stronger Incentives Policies intended to scare consumers into planning privately for the risk and cost of LTC did not work. People could always ignore LTC and, if they needed expensive care over an extended period later, easily transfer the liability to Medicaid. The program’s financial eligibility rules allowed (1) ownership of practically unlimited exempt assets; (2) asset transfers five years in advance; (3) very large home equity protection; (4) major trust, annuity, and life estate exemptions; (5) large incomes so long as private health and LTC expenses were also high; and (6) substantial wealth transfer to heirs due to scant enforcement of the estate recovery mandate. Easy access to Medicaid meant the measures taken to encourage LTC planning and policies to encourage the purchase of private insurance for LTC largely failed. This condition will remain unless and until the public is engaged in LTC planning earlier in life. How to Engage the Public in Long-Term Care Planning While They Still Have Time to Prepare Step One: Eliminate Moral HazardLawmakers should eliminate the moral hazard that has discouraged early LTC planning. That is, end the ability and practice to (1) ignore the LTC risk; (2) avoid the need to save, invest, or insure to prepare; (3) wait to see if expensive care is ever needed and, if it is; (4) transfer the liability to taxpayers by qualifying for Medicaid while preserving wealth. The methods people use to preserve wealth while qualifying for Medicaid LTC benefits late in life must cease. Those practices include but are not limited to:
A systematic review of Medicaid income and asset eligibility loopholes (described and promoted in the vast formal legal literature on Medicaid estate planning[38]) would reveal many more oversights in Medicaid law and regulations that discourage responsible LTC planning and smooth the way onto Medicaid for people who do not plan for LTC. Some of the more egregious examples include spousal refusal, life estates, and half-a-loaf strategies.[39] These should be eliminated as well. At a minimum, the GAO should immediately undertake a systematic study of Medicaid LTC eligibility rules and enforcement to ascertain the incidence and costs of these major loopholes. GAO should examine a valid random sample of Medicaid LTC cases generalizable to the national universe of such cases. Such a study should employ more intense review and verification techniques than are used by state Medicaid agencies. Severe staff and financial shortages cause the state agencies to miss applicants’ unreported income and resources, resulting in eligibility errors that closer scrutiny would reveal. Establishing national LTC financial eligibility error rates would finally reveal how much Medicaid loses as a safety net for the needy and how large its moral hazard impact is on the non-needy due to eligibility loopholes and errors. How These Policy Changes Would Impact the LTC MarketWithout any government program ensuring both the financing of LTC benefits and asset protection in the future, consumers would be far more concerned about LTC risk and therefore much more likely than they are now to save, invest, or insure against the risk. Fewer middle-class and affluent people would end up dependent on public assistance, so the public safety net could do a better job for the truly needy. Adult children would encourage and assist their parents to plan ahead instead of turning to Medicaid for relief when needed. Principles of personal responsibility guided by risk management techniques would prevail. More private financing would flow through the service delivery system relieving LTC providers from the burden of notoriously low Medicaid reimbursement rates. The market would set prices and allocate resources to meet consumer preferences instead of providers offering only what the government is able and willing to finance. Home- and community-based services would dominate—because that is what people prefer—and investors, entrepreneurs, and companies would be rewarded for providing these services. Nursing homes would still have an important role, but they would primarily provide skilled sub-acute and rehabilitative care rather than long-term custodial assistance. These policy changes should be phased in so that they affect older people less or not at all and give younger people enough time to adapt. For example, people 55 or older and younger people with chronic disability or early onset dementia could be exempted from the change altogether. Current rules would remain in effect for them as they age into their 80s, the time of life when LTC becomes most likely. People 45-54, newly on notice that they can no longer count on easy access to Medicaid LTC while preserving wealth, should be expected to have a minimal level of LTC savings, investment, or insurance in place by age 65 sufficient to offset their average LTC liability. Likewise, people younger than 44 should be on notice that they need to have sufficient resources set aside by age 65 to offset their average catastrophic LTC risk. How each of these age groups can reasonably be expected to achieve these levels of protection is addressed below under Steps Three and Four. We will need to monitor and enforce compliance with these new expectations regarding LTC planning. Without either, we can expect widespread non-compliance, leaving many unprotected for LTC risk as now but no longer protected against asset spend down in the future as before. Private fiduciary organizations could be tasked with identifying individuals’ LTC risks and to follow up with each person until the risk is covered. There could be a role for some level of government to follow up with people who remain derelict in this responsibility. Artificial intelligence could help monitor and administer a program to incentivize early LTC planning.[40] Step Two: Publicize LTC Risk and CostOnce Medicaid is preserved for the truly needy by preventing people from using it late in life and protecting their wealth, that change should be publicized widely. Without the ability to access government programs to finance LTC later in life while preserving wealth, people will have far greater incentives to engage in proper planning. From Washington State’s experiment in payroll-funded social insurance for LTC, we know that individuals will prepare once they are confronted with the urgent need to deal with LTC risk. Washington Governor Jay Inslee signed a law in 2019 establishing the WA Cares Fund. The program was designed to charge workers a 0.58 percent payroll tax beginning January 1, 2022, to fund a lifetime LTC benefit of up to $36,500 after a 10-year vesting period. It faced strong public opposition, failing twice to receive citizens’ support at the ballot box.[41] To make WA Cares more attractive to voters, an opt-out choice was added that allowed people to avoid the payroll tax by owning private LTC insurance purchased no later than November 1, 2021. As of August 15, 2022, 475,072 Washingtonians had taken that option,[42] overwhelming the private LTC insurance carriers’ ability and desire to supply the product.[43] Carriers, backlogged by the heavy new demand, worried the new policies taken out in minimal amounts to avoid the payroll tax would quickly lapse, creating an administrative headache and expense. The key insight of the WA Cares Fund experience is that it took forcing people to pay immediately for LTC to get them to purchase private insurance for the risk. Prior to the Washington experience, no amount of scaring people about LTC cost or encouraging them with tax incentives persuaded many to buy the product. After WA Cares offered a way to opt out of its payroll tax, LTC insurance sales exploded. Nationally, more than three times as many people purchased the product in 2021 compared to 2020. Most of these new buyers were Washingtonians seeking to escape the WA Cares program’s payroll tax.[44] Adding the opt out harmed the program by diverting individuals with higher incomes and more favorable LTC risks to private coverage, but it also pointed the way to better LTC policy. Clearly, an important answer to the LTC challenge lies in making LTC risk and cost real for consumers earlier in their lives. Eliminating Medicaid eligibility loopholes would create this condition, and it does so without threatening all workers with a new, economically harmful payroll tax as in the WA Cares example. Publicizing the change in future Medicaid LTC eligibility across the country, at least as widely and frequently as WA Cares was promoted to Washingtonians, should result in a similar increase in consumer demand for any and all private means to save, invest, or insure against LTC risk and cost. Step Three: Reconceptualize the LTC ChallengeLTC risk and cost are both frightening and seemingly so distant in the future that most people choose to ignore them, especially in the face of more immediately pressing responsibilities. One key to refocus consumers on LTC is to reconceptualize the problem, with new information that reveals it is less intimidating than usually conceived. In the past several years, new research has suggested that LTC may not be such an overwhelming financial risk for most people as previously assumed. In 2022, HHS’s Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation estimated “that over half (56%) of Americans turning 65 today will develop a disability serious enough to require LTSS.”[45] But that means nearly half, 44 percent, can expect to have zero LTC need. In fact, “While individuals on average will need 0.8 years of paid LTSS, 55% of older adults will not use any paid LTSS.”[46] Furthermore, on average “an American turning 65 today will incur $120,900 in future LTSS costs, measured in today’s dollars.”[47] This amount could be financed by setting aside[48] the present discounted value of $69,800[49] at age 65.[50] Earmarking $70,000 at age 65 for future LTC expenses does not sound nearly as daunting as insuring against the full catastrophic LTC risk potential of $250,000.[51] If people begin LTC planning earlier than age 65, even less would be needed to set aside.[52] In essence, the burden is much more manageable than previously conceived. Once the principle is established that every person has a responsibility to cover an objectively determined amount of LTC liability by a certain age, each person’s target amount could be adjusted in a way that treats people fairly based on their sex, income, health status, and other relevant demographic characteristics. People Already Have More Funds Available for LTC Than They Are Using NowThere is more good news. In June 2019, Johnson and Wang “simulated the financial burden of paid home care for a nationally representative sample of non-Medicaid community-dwelling adults ages sixty-five and older.”[53] They “found that 74 percent could fund at least two years of a moderate amount of paid home care if they liquidated all of their assets, and 58 percent could fund at least two years of an extensive amount of paid home care.”[54] Furthermore: “Nearly nine in ten older adults have enough resources, including income and wealth, to cover assisted living expenses for two years.”[55] So the potential LTC financial burden is much more manageable than we thought. The evidence that people accumulate substantial savings that could be used for LTC if they had more incentive to do so is very encouraging. Assuming the removal of Medicaid’s generous financial eligibility rules that obviate the need to plan for LTC, the path forward will be much less fraught. Exactly How Much Wealth Do People Have and Why Aren’t They Using More of It for LTC?This paper’s Appendix answers those questions based on new research and draws the appropriate conclusions for LTC financing policy reform. Step Four: Show Younger People a Better WayEven if the LTC financing challenge is not as daunting as previously believed and families possess more wealth than we thought, we still need ways to make it easier for younger people and families to identify and put to use the means at their disposal to prepare for LTC risk and cost. Government should advise all Americans by age 25 that LTC planning is a personal responsibility planning for which should start no later than age 40 and be achieved by age 65. The termination of all methods to qualify for Medicaid LTC benefits late in life while preserving wealth should be disclosed, publicized, and frequently reiterated in state and federal government publications. By age 65, most Americans should be prepared to pay for their expected LTC expenses, which would require them on average to have $70,000 saved, set aside, or insured for that purpose. LTC Choices 1-7 below suggest some methods by which people could fulfill their LTC planning responsibility. Entrepreneurs can be expected to produce many more. A private fiduciary organization similar to Underwriters Laboratories could counsel Americans on LTC risk and cost, propose methods to prepare, evaluate their proposals to meet their responsibility, and help them achieve the needed protection. Private insurers could estimate individual need and recommend the necessary level of coverage with quality control review by independent actuaries or auditors. Following are several possibilities that could satisfy the need to plan for LTC with minimal financial disruption for individuals and families carrying other financial responsibilities at the same time. The basic strategy is twofold: (1) to aim LTC planning toward a more realistic goal of meeting each individual’s probable risk and (2) to minimize the immediate cost of preparing for LTC risk by earmarking funds already accumulated in retirement savings to be used for LTC if and only if LTC becomes necessary. Methods to Satisfy Individual LTC ResponsibilityLTC Choice #1: Private Insurance. Purchase private LTC insurance that meets minimal coverage standards based on age, sex, health status, etc. Instead of huge premiums to cover potential lifetime coverage of expensive nursing home custodial care,[56] adequate insurance coverage for each individual’s personal risk will prove much more affordable. Most analysts believe private LTC insurance is unlikely ever to penetrate enough middle-income households to become a significant payment source. But they have always assumed that people would need much more coverage at too great a cost to attract enough buyers to make a big difference. That assumption may be wrong. Smaller, less expensive LTC insurance policies could have a disproportionately large impact on the aging public’s ability to afford senior housing, including home care and assisted living. The National Investment Center reported that reducing the annual cost of senior housing by $15,000, from $60,000 to $45,000 per year, would expand the middle market for senior housing[57] by 3.6 million individuals, enabling 71 percent of middle-income seniors to afford the product.[58] Where could consumers find that extra $15,000 to bring the cost of senior housing into reach? The premium for an annual LTC insurance benefit of $15,000 would only cost a small fraction of the premium required for the comprehensive coverage that consumers find so financially daunting now. Unfortunately, insurance regulations sometimes forbid carriers from offering coverage with a benefit of less than $18,000 per year. Once again, well-intentioned regulation stands in the way of sensible LTC policy and planning. LTC Choice #2: Investment Accounts. Establish a new tax-deferred investment account similar to the 401(k) or IRAs already available to cover future predictable LTC expenses. Consider a fully tax-exempt investment account as an even greater savings facilitator. To soften the impact of contributing to an extra retirement account, savers could be allowed to use a portion of their existing retirement accounts or health savings accounts to satisfy the LTC responsibility.[59] The strategy is to use a portion of funds already saved for other purposes by allocating them for LTC if and only if LTC becomes necessary. LTC Choice #3: Retirement Savings. Allow a portion of retirement savings to meet the LTC planning responsibility. At the end of March 2023, total U.S. retirement assets were $35.4 trillion, including $12.5 trillion in IRAs, $9.8 trillion in defined contribution accounts, and $10.9 trillion in combined government and private defined benefit plans. Annuity reserves outside of retirement accounts add another $2.2 trillion.[60] LTC Choice #4: Home Equity. Over 78 percent of age 65 and over households own homes.[61] Many could lien their home equity to support LTC or withdraw sufficient funds through reverse mortgages to purchase private LTC insurance as in LTC Choice #1. The $12.4 trillion in home equity held by people 62 years of age and older[62] would both cover the LTC expenses for a large portion of them and send huge waves of desperately needed private revenue into the LTC service delivery system. This new private revenue—at rates 50 percent more than what Medicaid pays—would improve care quality and access for all LTC patients, including those dependent on public financing. Estimating potential savings to Medicaid from this source is difficult. Little is known about current home ownership by Medicaid LTC recipients, because Medicaid exempts most home equity. A dated (but unique) 1989 GAO study found, “About 14 percent of the Medicaid nursing home residents in the eight states GAO reviewed owned a home,” and “By using home equity to defray Medicaid costs as Oregon does, the six states that now lack recovery programs could recover about $85 million [$218 million in today’s dollars] from recipients admitted to nursing homes.”[63] Diverting home equity earlier in life to finance LTC risk later, instead of relying on Medicaid and then attempting to recover from estates after death, would unleash the huge potential of home equity to finance quality LTC for more people. LTC Choice #5: Life Insurance. Many life insurance policy holders can carve out enough of their cash values or death benefits to meet their personal LTC responsibility. Total life insurance coverage in the United States was $21.2 trillion by the end of 2021.[64] There are several ways to access the cash value of life insurance without dying. They include dropping the policy to collect its surrender value, selling the policy by means of a “life settlement,” and withdrawing funds or borrowing from the policy.[65] Even a term life policy, with no cash value, can sometimes be sold.[66] The current perverse incentive created by government policy when people need LTC is to liquidate cash value life insurance, spend the money on exempt assets, and then apply for Medicaid when the funds are gone. Eliminating that loophole would free up trillions of private life insurance value to offset public LTC expenditures. LTC Choice #6: The Deferred Reverse Estate Annuity Mortgage (DREAM). This option—a legally binding and officially recorded lien on one’s estate set aside for LTC—does not currently exist, but it is similar to the existing Medicaid estate recovery obligation except that it moves the responsibility forward in time and ensures eventual LTC funding availability. The DREAM mortgage satisfies the LTC planning responsibility only if it is formally executed, is legally recorded, and applies to all property that will pass inside or outside of a probated estate. Unlike asset transfer limitations and estate recovery, this option secures the property so that it is available to pay for care in the private market. This is a way for people to prepare for LTC risk and cost, lock in the ability to pay privately for care, and have no immediate need to expend income. They merely obligate a portion of their estates for their LTC if needed. Any remainder would pass to heirs, although it would be unprotected by Medicaid, as it is currently. This is the easiest and least intrusive of all the methods to satisfy the LTC planning responsibility. LTC Choice #7: Capture the other end of the age spectrum from estates. People who begin saving, insuring, or setting aside resources for LTC before age 40 could receive a reduced LTC responsibility level. So, in addition to the lower discounted present value of their LTC responsibility, they would have an added incentive to begin LTC planning earlier. Employers could introduce LTC responsibility to job seekers in their early 20s. Increasingly, younger people are having to care for their parents and grandparents. If they become sensitized to the need for LTC planning earlier than others and they take action, their LTC responsibility could be satisfied earlier and at less personal cost than for others who begin preparation later in life. All seven of
these options are manageable by private companies—such as employers,
insurers, banks, or brokers—eliminating much of the huge federal and state
bureaucracy currently managing Medicaid LTC eligibility determination and
estate recovery. Other tools and methods of satisfying the LTC planning
objective will evolve naturally in a market not distorted by Medicaid
rules that reward failure to plan. [29] For purposes of income spend down, as opposed to asset spend down, Medicaid does require that monthly income be expended for health or LTC expenses to qualify as a cost under medically needy income eligibility rules. Analysts often confuse this distinction and assume incorrectly that assets must be, and usually are, spent for health-related costs as well. There is no evidence that people decumulate assets due to health or LTC expenses, despite analysts’ typical assumption that they do. They ignore the possibility that assets could be divested by other means, such as Medicaid planning techniques. [30] States apply exempt asset rules inconsistently, and the federal government enforces them inconsistently. [31] For example: “The real goal, though, is to work with your parents on an asset-shifting plan that will allow them to have Medicaid pick up the tab for their long-term care if need be.… One way to do this is by turning assets that aren’t exempt from Medicaid into those that are. Money in the bank or a certificate of deposit could be spent on a prepaid funeral or a more extravagant engagement ring, for example; both are exempt assets” (Smart Money, October 1997, pp. 134-36). “Another sheltering strategy is to convert available, countable assets into non-countable exempt assets. For example, money in checking or savings accounts may be used, without creating a period of ineligibility, to purchase or improve a home, pay off a mortgage, buy a cemetery lot, pre-pay funeral services, pre-pay residence-related taxes and insurance, or even pay outstanding bills, including legal fees” (Hal Fliegelman and Debora C. Fliegelman, “Giving Guardians the Power to Do Medicaid Planning,” Wake Forest Law Review 32, no. 2 [Summer 1997], pp. 341-42, 359, 362-64, 373). “Viatical settlements may provide an opportunity for families that include a senior in need of long-term care, to meet financial obligations without disqualifying the senior for Medicaid benefits…. Viatication affords a policyholder the means by which to convert a ‘non-exempt’ asset (i.e., a life insurance policy) to an ‘exempt’ asset for purposes of Medicaid regulation…. Possible uses of viatical settlement proceeds to create an ‘exempt’ asset include: (a) paying off a home mortgage; (b) making major home repairs or improvements; (c) paying off outstanding medical bills; (d) prepaying tax obligations, including real estate taxes; (e) purchasing or replacing a car; (f) creating a burial fund or making prepayments for funeral costs; and (g) purchasing a long-term care policy for a spouse. These alternative uses permit viators to put viatical proceeds to good use and still retain their Medicaid eligibility or the Medicaid eligibility of their spouses” (NAELA, 1996 conference proceedings, Session 11, pp. 18-19, 21-23). [32] Enforcement of this requirement should be as routine as enforcement of the existing rule that income spend down for medically needy eligibility must be for health-related costs. [33] Law Offices of Stephen J. Silverberg, “What Is a Medicaid Asset Protection Trust (MAPT)?,” https://www.sjslawpc.com/practice-areas/what-is-a-medicaid-asset-protection-trust-mapt/. [34] Krause Financial Services, “Medicaid Compliant Annuity,” https://www.medicaidannuity.com/products/medicaid-compliant-annuity/. [35] On September 14, 2012, four congressional sponsors of the Medicaid Long-Term Care Reform Act (H.R. 6033) queried state governors “on policies to strengthen program integrity and make Medicaid more sustainable for state and federal budgets.” The questions they asked and the responses they received, including the Medicaid compliant annuity examples cited above, are summarized in Stephen A. Moses, “LTC Bullet: States Decry Medicaid LTC Loopholes,” Center for Long-Term Care Reform, January 11, 2013, http://www.centerltc.com/bullets/archives2013/984.htm; and Stephen A. Moses, “LTC Bullet: The Medicaid Long-Term Care Reform Act of 2012,” Center for Long-Term Care Reform, October 5, 2012, http://www.centerltc.com/bullets/archives2012/973.htm. [36] The ineligibility penalty is the number of months of delayed eligibility equal to the amount of assets transferred for less than fair market value for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid divided by the average cost of a nursing home in the state. [37] “Median time from recorded diagnosis until institutionalization and until death for people with dementia was 3.9 and 5.0 years, respectively” (Karlijn J. Joling et al., “Time from Diagnosis to Institutionalization and Death in People with Dementia,” Alzheimer’s and Dementia 16, no. 4 [April 2020], https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32072728/). [38] A partial annotated bibliography of Medicaid planning publications is available in Stephen A. Moses, “How to Fix Long-Term Care Financing,” Center for Long-Term Care Reform, July 26, 2017, pp. 34-65, http://www.centerltc.com/pubs/How-To-Fix-Long-Term-Care-Financing.pdf. [39] “Spousal Refusal, which has been dubbed, ‘just say no,’ is when a non-applicant spouse of a long-term care Medicaid applicant refuses to help pay the cost of long-term care for their spouse. While spouses are legally obligated to financially support one another, Medicaid cannot legally deny care if a non-applicant spouse refuses to contribute towards the cost of care of their spouse” (American Council on Aging, “How Spousal Refusal Works as a Strategy to Medicaid Eligibility,” updated May 31, 2023, https://www.medicaidplanningassistance.org/spousal-refusal/). Note that spousal refusal is clearly illegal under federal law, but it is routinely permitted in New York and Florida and sporadically in some other states. Life estate: “A common dilemma that our Fortune 500 clients run into is how to preserve their homes while also gaining Medicare [sic] eligibility. A transfer subject to a life estate may be used to preserve your home and facilitate your eligibility for Medicaid. With this planning tool, you transfer the ‘remainder interest’ in your house to your children (or other beneficiaries), and keep a ‘life estate’ for yourself. As a practical matter, you deed the house to the remainder beneficiaries and incorporate language in the deed to retain your life estate. The life estate gives you the legal right to live in the house for life” (Kevin Won, “Residence Transfer Subject to Life Estate: Medicaid Planning for Fortune 500 Employees and Retirees,” The Retirement Group, October 29, 2020, link). “Half a Loaf, Reverse Half a Loaf, and Modern Half a Loaf are Medicaid gifting strategies (also called transfer strategies) that have been or are currently used for the purpose of reducing countable assets to qualify for Medicaid. These strategies can also preserve some of the Medicaid applicant’s assets for their family members” (American Council on Aging, “How the Modern Half a Loaf Strategy Helps Families Become Medicaid Eligible and Preserves Assets,” updated January 25, 2023, https://www.medicaidplanningassistance.org/modern-half-a-loaf/). [40] “A data analytics application could review household data or claims information to spot anomalous patterns that suggest ineligibility.” William J. Oliver with Josh Archambault, “MassHealth Protecting Medicaid Resources for the Most Vulnerable: How Massachusetts Saved Hundreds of Millions through Enhanced Eligibility Verification,” Pioneer Institute, October 2018, p. 7, link [41] “Washington Advisory Vote 20, a non-binding question concerning whether to maintain or repeal House Bill 1087, was on the ballot in Washington as an advisory question on November 5, 2019. A majority of voters voted in favor of repealing the bill.” Ballotpedia, “Washington Advisory Vote 20, Nonbinding Question on Tax to Fund Long-Term Healthcare Services (2019),” link. “Washington Senate Joint Resolution 8212, the Authorize Fund Investment of Long-Term Services and Supports Trust Account Amendment, was on the ballot in Washington as a legislatively referred constitutional amendment on November 3, 2020. It was defeated.” Ballotpedia, “Washington Senate Joint Resolution 8212, Authorize Fund Investment of Long-Term Services and Supports Trust Account Amendment (2020),” link. [42] “As of Monday, Aug. 15, [2022] the [State of Washington] Employment Security Department reports the following WA Cares exemption numbers: · Total opt-out requests submitted: 478,781 · Total opt-out requests processed: 478,681 · Total opt-out requests approved: 475,072 · Applications processed as a percentage of total: 99.98%.” Elizabeth Hovde, “Updated Numbers on People Exempted from State’s Long-Term-Care Program and Payroll Tax,” Washington Policy Center, August 16, 2022, https://www.washingtonpolicy.org/publications/detail/updated-numbers-on-people-exempted-from-states-long-term-care-program-and-payroll-tax. [43] “Washington State’s ‘Washington Cares Fund’ (WCF) stimulated a tremendous demand for private LTCI from individuals and businesses within WA…. Partly because the tax applies to all earned income, LTCI sales in Washington soared to unprecedented levels. Insurers quickly became backlogged with applications and were concerned about early lapses as the law provided a permanent WCF exemption based on only a one-time attestation. Insurers reduced design flexibility, and then discontinued sales in WA before the November 1 deadline.” Claude Thau, Allen Schmitz, and Chris Giese, “2022 Milliman Long Term Care Insurance Survey,” Broker World, July 1, 2022, https://brokerworldmag.com/2022-milliman-long-term-care-insurance-survey/. [44] “We estimate total stand-alone LTCI annualized new premium sales of nearly $200 million in 2021 … almost 1/3 more than our 2020 estimate of $150 million. However, premium outside the state of Washington decreased 6.0 percent, based on the insurers that reported sales. “We estimate that 140,000 to 150,000 people purchased stand-alone LTCI coverage in 2021, more than triple the 2020 numbers. Outside of WA, the number of new insureds dropped 9.4 percent based on the insurers that reported sales.” Thau, Schmitz, and Giese, “2022 Milliman Long Term Care Insurance Survey.” [45] Richard W. Johnson and Judith Dey, “Long-Term Services and Supports for Older Americans: Risks and Financing, 2022,” HHS, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, revised August 2022, p. 1, https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/08b8b7825f7bc12d2c79261fd7641c88/ltss-risks-financing-2022.pdf. LTSS stands for “long-term services and supports,” another term for LTC. [46] Johnson and Dey, “Long-Term Services and Supports for Older Americans,” p. 6. [47] Johnson and Dey, “Long-Term Services and Supports for Older Americans,” p. 1. On page 5, Johnson and Dey clarify: “We project that total paid LTSS expenses will average $120,900 per person (Table 3). Medicaid is the largest payer of LTSS, averaging $51,800 after age 65 and accounting for 43% of the total. Family out-of-pocket costs are also substantial, averaging $44,800 and accounting for 37% of the total.” [48] “These estimates differ from a present discounted value (PDV) of expenditures at age 65, the amount that an individual would need to set aside at age 65 to cover future LTSS expenses. The PDV is lower than the sum-of-expenditures measure because it accounts for the investment returns that could be earned on funds set aside at age 65 until LTSS expenses begin, often after age 80. We show PDV projections in the appendix.” Johnson and Dey, “Long-Term Services and Supports for Older Americans,” p. 6. [49] Johnson and Dey, “Long-Term Services and Supports for Older Americans,” p. 17. Table A1. [50] “PDV estimates, which are reported in Tables A1-A9, use the Social Security trustees’ ultimate real interest rate of 2.5%. Because the trustees assume long-range price growth averages 2.6%, this real discount rate is equivalent to a nominal long-run discount rate of about 5.1%.” Johnson and Dey, “Long-Term Services and Supports for Older Americans,” p. 13. [51] See footnote 75. [52] Resources set aside for future LTC expenses would be expended in the private LTC market, where services cost more—often 150 percent of what Medicaid pays for the same service. This differential needs to be accounted for in estimating the average and catastrophic LTC responsibility of individuals. On the plus side, paying privately for LTC tends to command better access to higher quality care across a wider choice of care venues than Medicaid does. [53] Richard W. Johnson and Claire Xiaozhi Wang, “The Financial Burden of Paid Home Care on Older Adults: Oldest and Sickest Are Least Likely to Have Enough Income,” Health Affairs 38, no. 6 (June 2019), p. 994, https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2019.00025. [54] Johnson and Wang, “The Financial Burden of Paid Home Care on Older Adults.” [55] Johnson and Wang, “The Financial Burden of Paid Home Care on Older Adults,” p. 1000. [56] “Over the past two decades, annual LTCI premiums in the stand-alone market have increased significantly for both current and new policyholders. Higher average premiums reflect increased demand for more comprehensive benefit packages (including inflation protection) and higher daily benefit amounts” (Kirsten J. Colello, “Long-Term Care Insurance: Overview,” Congressional Research Service, updated July 21, 2023, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11614). [57] “We conservatively defined the middle market as those individuals in the 41st to 80th percentile of individual income and annuitized assets in 2014. For seniors age 75-84, that band corresponds to $25,001 to $74,298 in annual income and assets. The band is wider for older seniors age 85 and above, where it ranges from $24,450 to $95,051” (Beth Burnham Mace et al., “Middle Market Seniors Housing Study: Executive Summary,” National Investment Center, https://www.nic.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Executive-Summary.pdf). [58] “By reducing annual seniors housing costs by $15,000 per year—from $60,000 to $45,000— the potential market expands by 3.6 million individuals 75+. At the $45,000 annual cost level, 10.2 (71 percent) million middle-income seniors have resources including housing equity above the annual cost” (Mace et al., “Middle Market Seniors Housing Study”). [59] Already, limited LTC insurance premiums and certain LTC expenses can be withdrawn from HSAs tax free. [60] Investment Company Institute, “Release: Quarterly Retirement Market Data,” June 14, 2023, https://www.ici.org/statistical-report/ret_23_q1. [61] “According to the Housing Vacancy Survey, 78.5 percent of households age 65 and over owned their primary residences in 2018.” Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, “Housing America's Older Adults 2019: A Supplement to the State of the Nation’s Housing Report,” 2019, p. 6, link. [62] National Reverse Mortgage Lenders Association, “Senior Home Equity Levels Fall Slightly to $12.39T in Q4,” press release, April 21, 2023, link. [63] GAO, Medicaid: Recoveries from Nursing Home Residents’ Estates Could Offset Program Costs, p. 4. [64] “Americans purchased $3.3 trillion of new life insurance coverage in 2021, a 1.3 percent decrease from 2020. By the end of 2021, total life insurance coverage in the United States was $21.2 trillion, an increase of 3.7 percent from 2020 (Table 7.1).” American Council of Life Insurers, “Life Insurers Fact Book,” November 28, 2022, https://www.acli.com/about-the-industry/life-insurers-fact-book. [65] “Life insurance can provide much-needed cash for loved ones you leave behind when you die.… But life insurance also can provide cash for you while you’re living—that is, if you have a cash value life insurance policy.… You can access the cash in a variety of ways. That’s right: It’s yours for the taking.” Cameron Huddleston, “Cash Out Life Insurance Guide,” Forbes, updated May 19, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/advisor/life-insurance/tap-cash-value/. [66] “You can sell either a term life policy or a permanent life policy. However, if you have a term life policy, investors prefer that the policy have an option to be converted to a permanent policy because they don’t want to risk having the insured outlive the length of the policy…. Or the insured’s life expectancy must be shorter than the term of the policy to sell it.” Cameron Huddleston and Amy Denise, “Life Settlements Provide Escape Hatch When You Need Cash,” Forbes, updated March 28, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/advisor/life-insurance/life-settlements/. |