



**How to Save Medicaid \$20 Billion Per Year  
AND  
Improve the Program in the Process**  
by  
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### **A Foundation in Facts**

- Medicaid expenditures today exceed the cost of Medicare and continue to explode.
- Medicaid is the biggest item in state budgets, exceeding elementary and secondary education combined.
- Long-term care (LTC) accounts for one-third to one-half of total Medicaid expenditures in most states, 35 percent on average.<sup>1</sup>
- For 2002, the latest data reported by CMS, total Medicaid and related expenditures were \$333 billion.<sup>2</sup>
- Of this, Medicaid-financed nursing home care accounted for approximately \$50.9 billion and home care, \$8.4 billion.
- Medicaid LTC recipients consume a disproportionate share of total program expenditures. For example, consider people eligible for Medicaid AND Medicare.
- Such "dual eligibles" account for 42 percent of Medicaid spending, although they comprise only 16 percent of Medicaid recipients.<sup>3</sup>
- Dual eligibles are heavy users of long-term care and acute care services not covered by Medicare. And Medicaid pays for their Medicare premiums and cost-sharing too.
- The aged, blind and disabled--also heavy users of LTC--are 1/4 of Medicaid recipients but account for 2/3 of program costs, whereas poor women and children are 3/4 of the recipients but account for only 1/3 of the cost.

### **Key Points**

- The heaviest users of Medicaid's most expensive benefit (LTC)--dual eligibles and the aged, blind and disabled (ABD)--consume a disproportionate share of Medicaid's total resources.<sup>4</sup>
- Therefore, every actual or potential dual eligible, ABD or LTC recipient diverted from Medicaid dependency will result in a disproportionate savings to the Medicaid program.
- Conclusion: prevent Medicaid dependency for even a small number of these heavy LTC users, and the savings will be extraordinarily high.

### **Queries**

- Aren't dual eligibles, the aged, blind and disabled, and heavy LTC users the poorest of the poor?

- Isn't Medicaid their safety net which protects them only after catastrophic spend down has devastated their life's savings and driven them into financial destitution?
- How can you possibly hope to divert such people from Medicaid dependency without destroying their lives and the lives of their spouses and dependants?

### **Examine Your Premises**

- Are people on Medicaid necessarily poor? Only if they need acute or preventive medical care. Not if they're aged, blind or disabled and eligible because they need long-term care.
- Income is rarely an obstacle to Medicaid eligibility for people who require LTC. If they have too little income to pay all their medical expenses, including nursing home care, they're eligible.<sup>5</sup>
- In other words, you don't need to be poor to qualify for Medicaid long-term care benefits. All you need is a cash flow problem.
- Medicaid limits non-exempt assets for LTC recipients to \$2000. But, exempt assets are unlimited.
- For example, a home and all contiguous property, a business including the capital and cash flow, and one automobile, all of unlimited value plus many, many other resources are excluded from eligibility asset limits.
- Married couples are assured of even higher income and asset protections, including up to \$2,377.50 of monthly income and up to \$95,100 of assets for the community spouse as of 2005.<sup>6</sup>
- On top of these already generous income and asset limits, Medicaid planners use both simple and sophisticated techniques to protect additional hundreds of thousands of dollars for affluent clients and their heirs.
- Such techniques include gifting strategies, annuities, trusts, life care contracts and dozens of others delineated in hundreds of law journal and popular media articles and books.
- Google "Medicaid estate planning" to find thousands of methods and purveyors of self-impoverishment to qualify for Medicaid.
- Similar techniques allow people with substantial income and assets to avoid Medicaid's estate recovery requirements, which in any case, are rarely enforced effectively by the states.

### **Bottom Line**

- Medicaid is not primarily a long-term care safety net for people who have spent down into impoverishment.
- Rather, Medicaid is the principal payor of long-term care for nearly everyone.
- Medicaid pays less than half the dollars for nursing home care, but covers 2/3 of nursing home residents and touches over 80 percent of all nursing home patient days.<sup>7</sup>
- Out-of-pocket expenditures for nursing home care are down from 38.5 percent in 1988 to 25.1 percent in 2002.<sup>8</sup>
- Nearly half of these already low out-of-pocket costs actually come from the Social Security income of people already on Medicaid, not from asset spend down.<sup>9</sup>

- When you back out all nursing home costs paid by Medicaid, Medicare, Social Security spend-through of Medicaid recipients, and other personal income, individuals' and families' assets are at risk for less than one dollar in five of nursing home costs.<sup>10</sup>
- Home care is no different. Only 18.0 percent of home health care costs were paid out of pocket in 2002.<sup>11</sup>

### **Building on These Facts**

- How can we take advantage of the fact that Medicaid LTC does not require impoverishment to improve the program and reduce its cost?
- First ask: what is the single biggest asset Medicaid protects from long-term care costs?
- Answer: the home. Medicaid exempts the home and all contiguous property regardless of value both for nursing home and home care recipients.<sup>12</sup>
- What do we know about senior's home equity? Eighty-one percent of seniors own their homes; 73 percent of these senior homeowners own their homes free and clear.<sup>13</sup>
- Altogether, seniors own nearly two trillion dollars worth of home equity.<sup>14</sup>
- This home equity wealth is currently illiquid, largely untapped for long-term care costs, totally exempted from Medicaid eligibility limits, and usually avoids Medicaid estate recovery.
- There are ways to liquefy this wealth and put it to use financing quality long-term care for frail and chronically ill seniors. For example . . .
- Reverse mortgages are private financial products that allow people to convert illiquid home equity into usable income or assets which they can use in any way they see fit AND still remain in their homes as long as they are able.<sup>15</sup>
- According to the National Council on the Aging (NCOA), 48% of America's 13.2 million households age 62 and older could get \$72,128 on average from reverse mortgages. "In total, an estimated \$953 billion could be available from reverse mortgages for immediate long-term care needs and to promote aging in place."<sup>16</sup>
- Yet, reverse mortgages are rarely used to finance long-term care today. Why?
- Simple: Because Medicaid LTC financing co-opts the market for reverse mortgages by paying for most formal long-term care for most Americans, thus obviating the need to tap home equity for this purpose.

### **The Solution**

- To save Medicaid billions of dollars every year and improve the program, replace the home equity exemption with a requirement that people consume their home equity with a reverse mortgage before they become eligible for Medicaid LTC benefits.
- How much could this save?
- Medicaid spent \$91 billion on 7.2 million dual eligibles in 2002 or \$12,646 per dually eligible recipient.<sup>17</sup>
- To save \$20 billion per year, Medicaid would only need to reduce the number of dual eligibles by approximately 1,581,500 or 22 percent.
- Is this feasible?

- Yes, if as NCOA reports, half of households headed by people over 62 could get over \$70,000 each from a reverse mortgage.
- That much money added to other income and assets and used for long-term care, especially private home and community-based services, could delay or prevent Medicaid eligibility for millions of Americans.
- The savings to Medicaid would easily exceed \$20,000,000,000 per year in combined state and federal expenditures, probably much more.
- Over time, Medicaid savings will increase rapidly beyond these initial estimates as more and more people plan ahead to pay their own LTC expenses by means of private long-term care insurance, a product whose sales will explode if and when it becomes needed to protect home equity from LTC expenses.

### **Poking Holes**

- If this is such a great idea, **why don't people already use reverse mortgages for long-term care expenses?** Why would they when Medicaid exempts the home and all contiguous property regardless of value and estate recovery is easy to avoid? Put home equity at risk and consumers will take long-term care seriously, plan for it, and save, invest or insure against the risk.
- **How does requiring people to use their home equity improve Medicaid?** With fewer people to serve, Medicaid will have more resources to help those who are genuinely in need. Medicaid will require fewer eligibility workers and estate recovery staff, thus reducing administrative costs. Part of the Medicaid savings can be applied to increasing reimbursement rates and expanding the continuum of services provided, thus improving access to and quality of care. Finally, the jobs created in the financial services industry (reverse mortgage lenders) and the insurance industry (LTC insurance agents) will generate new tax revenues to help states and the federal government support Medicaid.
- **Wouldn't reverse mortgages impoverish spouses of Medicaid recipients and leave them dependent on public assistance?** No, just the opposite. Reverse mortgages provide extra income indefinitely. They are fully insured by the federal government so that families retain the income and the use of the home until they move, sell or die even if the home equity is entirely consumed.
- **Doesn't this take away a sacred right people have to pass their homes to heirs?** No, Congress made it clear over 20 years ago "that all of the resources available to an institutionalized individual, including equity in a home, which are not needed for the support of a spouse or dependent children will be used to defray the cost of supporting the individual in the institution."<sup>18</sup> That was the justification for estate recovery, which has not worked well because it is punitive, after the fact, and politically sensitive. Reverse mortgages as a pre-condition of eligibility would achieve the same objective far more efficiently.
- **Long-term care providers, including nursing homes, assisted living facilities, and home care agencies, would lose Medicaid patients, wouldn't they?** Yes, and they'll be thrilled to replace Medicaid recipients, whose reimbursement is often less than the cost of providing their care, with private patients who pay a sustainable market rate for the red-carpet access to top quality care they demand and receive as paying customers.

Furthermore, the influx of new revenue will improve access and quality for all long-term care patients, private pay and Medicaid.

- **Won't baby boomer heirs, who are counting on inheritances protected by Medicaid, scream bloody murder?** Probably, but why should Medicaid, which was intended as a safety net for the poor, be inheritance insurance for middle-class boomers anyway? Boomers are exactly the generation we need to awaken to long-term care risk and to their need to insure against it. For nearly 40 years, Medicaid has done exactly the opposite. It has anesthetized boomers to the risk by paying for their parents' long-term care. We worry about the unfunded liabilities of Social Security and Medicare, but at least those programs have putative "trust funds." Medicaid is a dead-weight drag on state and federal general funds. Medicaid will have nowhere to turn when the demographic tsunami hits.
- **How would you prevent people from gaming this rule the same way they use Medicaid planning to circumvent the current system?** Most people who transfer assets to qualify for Medicaid do it after they have a long-term care crisis or when they (or usually their heirs) anticipate such a crisis coming soon. By that time, they don't qualify medically or cannot afford private LTC insurance, so they turn to Medicaid by hook or by crook. Confront them with a real Medicaid spend down liability while they are still young, healthy and affluent enough to insure privately and most people will do so. Unlike transfers of liquid assets or negotiable securities, real property transfers are publicly recorded and easily discovered. It would be simple to hold people accountable who give away large amounts of home equity any time before applying for Medicaid, even a decade or more.
- **This is a political non-starter because Medicaid is a "third rail" like Social Security and Medicare.** Nonsense. We are quickly approaching the time when the failure to confront exploding Medicaid costs will exceed confronting them honestly in political risk. How will politicians justify cutting dental benefits for poor children or slashing higher education or letting roads go unrepaired just so prosperous seniors can pass their wealth to affluent heirs at the expense of ever-skyrocketing Medicaid long-term care costs?
- **Do enough people currently receiving Medicaid LTC benefits own their homes to achieve such big savings immediately?** No, probably no more than 15 to 20 percent of people already receiving Medicaid still own their homes. Besides, policy makers would probably want to grandfather in current recipients under the status quo. The major savings will come over a period of three years as the Medicaid long-term care population turns over and fewer new recipients qualify until after they spend down their home equity with a reverse mortgage. The big question here is: what happens now to the homes owned by 81 percent of seniors by the time they qualify for Medicaid and most of them no longer own their homes? Are the homes being transferred to heirs? Are they being sold and the money used somehow? How? Evidently not for long-term care as the data explained above shows. Research is needed to answer these questions.

## Summary

- Medicaid is supposed to be America's long-term care safety net for the poor. Instead, it is the principal LTC payor for nearly everyone.

- Medicaid's LTC benefit has become "inheritance insurance" for baby boomers, lulling them into a false sense of security regarding their own future long-term care needs.
- Medicaid's generous LTC eligibility and elastic income and asset limits create perverse incentives that invite abuse and discourage responsible long-term care planning.
- The conventional wisdom that most people must spend down their life savings before they qualify for Medicaid long-term care benefits is a myth, demonstrably false.
- If people's biggest asset, their home equity, were at risk to pay for long-term care, most people would plan early to save, invest and insure against that risk.
- Reverse mortgages permit people to withdraw supplemental income or assets from their otherwise illiquid home equity without risking use of the home. This extra cash can purchase services to help them remain at home and delay or avoid Medicaid dependency altogether.
- The single most effective step Congress and the President can take to fix Medicaid, reduce its cost, and improve America's long-term care service delivery and financing system is to replace Medicaid's home equity exemption with a reverse mortgage as a pre-condition of eligibility.
- That simple measure will pump desperately needed financial oxygen into the LTC service delivery system, relieve the burden of Medicaid on taxpayers, enable Medicaid to provide better access to higher quality care for the genuinely needy, and supercharge the market for LTC insurance and home equity conversion products.

## End Notes

<sup>1</sup> Steven R. Gregory and Mary Jo Gibson, *Across the States, 2002 Profiles of Long-Term Care, Fifth Edition*, AARP Public Policy Institute, Washington, DC, 2002, p. xi, [http://research.aarp.org/health/d17794\\_2002\\_atp.pdf](http://research.aarp.org/health/d17794_2002_atp.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> The total of \$333 billion includes state and federal Medicaid and SCHIP (State Child Health Insurance Program) expansion and SCHIP expenditures. Source: "Table 9: Personal Health Care Expenditures, by Type of Expenditure and Source of Funds: Calendar Years 1995-2002," <http://www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/historical/t9.asp>.

<sup>3</sup> Judy Kasper, Risa Elias and Barbara Lyons, "Dual Eligibles: Medicaid's Role in Filling Medicare's Gaps," Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, March 2004, p. 1, <http://www.kff.org/medicaid/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=33892>

<sup>4</sup> "Per capita spending for dual eligibles in nursing facilities averages \$44,600, or about four times greater than spending for dual eligibles in the community (\$10,900) or for other Medicare beneficiaries (\$8,400). Because Medicare does not cover long-term care, the higher costs for the institutionalized fall heavily on the Medicaid program and account for nearly 4 out of 5 dollars that Medicaid spends on dual eligibles." Judy Kasper, Risa Elias and Barbara Lyons, "Dual Eligibles: Medicaid's Role in Filling Medicare's Gaps," Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, March 2004, p. 10, <http://www.kff.org/medicaid/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=33892>.

<sup>5</sup> This is true in "medically needy" states. In "income cap" states, a Miller income diversion trust achieves the same purpose.

<sup>6</sup> These "spousal impoverishment" protections began at \$1,500 per month of income and \$60,000 in assets with passage of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act in 1988. They increase with inflation annually.

<sup>7</sup> S. Feinleib, P. Cunningham, and P. Short, *Use of Nursing and Personal Care Homes by the Civilian Population, 1987* (AHCPR Pub. No. 94-0096), National Medical Expenditure Survey Research Findings 23, Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, Rockville, MD: Public Health Service, August 1994, p. 4.

<sup>8</sup> Source: "Table 7: Nursing Home Care Expenditures Aggregate and per Capita Amounts and Percent Distribution, by Source of Funds: Selected Calendar Years 1980-2002," <http://www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/historical/t7.asp>.

<sup>9</sup> Although Social Security is not usually considered to be a financing source for nursing home care, the fact is that it contributes very significantly albeit indirectly as "spend-through." Social security spend-through refers to income most seniors collect in the form of Social Security benefits which must be contributed toward their cost of care when they receive nursing-home services paid for by Medicaid. According to HCFA: "An estimated 41 percent...of out-

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of-pocket spending for nursing home care was received as income by patients or their representatives from monthly social security benefits.” (Helen C. Lazenby and Suzanne W. Letsch, “National Health Expenditures, 1989,” *Health Care Financing Review*, Vol. 12, No. 2, Winter 1990, p. 8.) Later research confirmed that Social Security spend-through is almost half of nursing home out-of-pocket costs. (Nelda McCall, "Long Term Care: Definition, Demand, Cost, and Financing," in Nelda McCall, editor, *Who Will Pay for Long-Term Care*, Health Administration Press, Chicago, Illinois, 2001, p. 19.)

<sup>10</sup> Source: "Table 7: Nursing Home Care Expenditures Aggregate and per Capita Amounts and Percent Distribution, by Source of Funds: Selected Calendar Years 1980-2002,"

<http://www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/historical/t7.asp> .

<sup>11</sup> Source: "Table 9: Personal Health Care Expenditures, by Type of Expenditure and Source of Funds: Calendar Years 1995-2002," <http://www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/historical/t9.asp> .

<sup>12</sup> Treatment of the home according to the Social Security Administration's Program Operations Manual System (POMS): <http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0501130100> : "An individual's home, REGARDLESS OF VALUE [emphasis added], is an excluded resource. . . . An individual's home is property in which he or she has an ownership interest and that serves as his or her principal place of residence. It can include:

\* the shelter in which he or she lives;

\* THE LAND ON WHICH THE SHELTER IS LOCATED [emphasis added]; and

\* related buildings on such land. . . . An individual's principal place of residence is the dwelling the individual considers his or her established or principal home and to which, if absent, he or she INTENDS TO RETURN [emphasis added]. It can be real or personal property, fixed or mobile, and located on land or water. . . . The home exclusion applies not only to the plot of land on which the home is located, but to any land that adjoins it." A small number of "209b" states can require sale of the home if no exempt relative resides in it and the Medicaid spouse is medically unable to return.

<sup>13</sup> United States Census Bureau, American Housing Survey for the United States: 2001, Table 7-1. Introductory Characteristics—Occupied Units With Elderly Householder,

<http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/ahs01/tab71.html> .

<sup>14</sup> "Recent studies show that older Americans, including those who have serious health problems and need long-term care, want to live at home rather than in an institution. Most elders (81% of those age 62 and older) own their homes and 74% of those own them free and clear. With \$1.9 trillion tied up in home equity, this financial resource has the potential to dramatically increase the ability of seniors to pay for long-term care at home. Reverse mortgages can free up needed cash while enabling seniors to continue to own their home." (Press Release of the National Council on the Aging, "Use Your Home to Stay at Home(tm) Program Study Shows That Reverse Mortgages Can Help Many with Long-Term Care Expenses," April 15, 2004,

<http://206.112.84.147/content.cfm?sectionID=61&detail=576> )

<sup>15</sup> A good source of information on home equity conversion is the National Reverse Mortgage Lenders Association at <http://www.reversemortgage.org/default.aspx> . Also see AARP's website at <http://www.aarp.org/revmort/> and the National Center for Home Equity Conversion at <http://www.reverse.org/>

<sup>16</sup> National Council on the Aging Press Release and Fact Sheet, "Use Your Home to Stay at Home(tm): Program Study Shows That Reverse Mortgages Can Help Many with Long-Term Care Expenses," April 15, 2004,

<http://www.ncoa.org/content.cfm?sectionID=105&detail=576#release> .

<sup>17</sup> The Kaiser Family Foundation [statehealthfacts.org](http://statehealthfacts.org) , "Total Dual Eligibles, 2002,"

[http://www.statehealthfacts.kff.org/cgi-](http://www.statehealthfacts.kff.org/cgi-bin/healthfacts.cgi?action=profile&area=United+States&category=Medicaid+%26+SCHIP&link_category=Medicare&link_subcategory=Dual+Eligibles&link_topic=Total+Dual+Eligibles)

[bin/healthfacts.cgi?action=profile&area=United+States&category=Medicaid+%26+SCHIP&link\\_category=Medicare&link\\_subcategory=Dual+Eligibles&link\\_topic=Total+Dual+Eligibles](http://www.statehealthfacts.kff.org/cgi-bin/healthfacts.cgi?action=profile&area=United+States&category=Medicaid+%26+SCHIP&link_category=Medicare&link_subcategory=Dual+Eligibles&link_topic=Total+Dual+Eligibles) and "Medicaid Spending for Dual Eligibles by Service in Millions, 2002," [http://www.statehealthfacts.kff.org/cgi-](http://www.statehealthfacts.kff.org/cgi-bin/healthfacts.cgi?action=profile&area=United+States&category=Medicaid+%26+SCHIP&link_category=Medicare&link_subcategory=Dual+Eligibles&link_topic=Medicaid+Spending+by+Service)

[bin/healthfacts.cgi?action=profile&area=United+States&category=Medicaid+%26+SCHIP&link\\_category=Medicare&link\\_subcategory=Dual+Eligibles&link\\_topic=Medicaid+Spending+by+Service](http://www.statehealthfacts.kff.org/cgi-bin/healthfacts.cgi?action=profile&area=United+States&category=Medicaid+%26+SCHIP&link_category=Medicare&link_subcategory=Dual+Eligibles&link_topic=Medicaid+Spending+by+Service) .

<sup>18</sup> United States Code, Congressional and Administrative News, 97th Congress—Second Session—1982, Legislative History (Public Laws 97-146 to 97-248) Volume 2, St. Paul, Minnesota, West Publishing Company, p. 814.