LTC Bullet: LTC Epiphany Friday, May 13, 2022 Seattle— LTC Comment: To fix long-term care once and for all we must front load the responsibility to plan and eliminate Medicaid’s financial honey trap on the back end. Enlightenment after the ***news.*** *** BE CAREFUL OUT THERE: “Friday the 13th is considered an unlucky day in Western superstition. It occurs when the 13th day of the month in the Gregorian calendar falls on a Friday, which happens at least once every year but can occur up to three times in the same year. … Friday the 13th occurs in any month that begins on a Sunday.” *** *** AGEWAVE INSPIRATION: Don’t miss Ken Dychtwald’s latest views on The Future of Medicine, Aging, Health and Longevity. You’ll gain knowledge, vision and motivation. Put them all to work in whatever you do to advance the field of long-term care. *** *** RECENTLY PUBLISHED ARTICLES by Steve Moses. We hope you’ll read these articles, join the Center for Long-Term Care Reform, and help us solve the long-term care financing problem. The Center’s “Membership Levels and Benefits” schedule is here. Join individually or urge your company or association to join as a corporate member so you can receive all the benefits of membership at no cost to you. Universal access to top quality care for all Americans (the Center’s mission) is achievable. Join us and make it happen! “Trappings of LTC system leave operators trapped,” by Stephen A. Moses, McKnight’s Long-Term Care News, February 23, 2022. (Originally titled more simply “Trapped.”) “The Great Long-Term Care Compromise,” by Stephen A. Moses, Broker World, January 1, 2022 “The irony of long-term care advocacy,” by Stephen A. Moses, McKnight’s Long-Term Care News, December 17, 2021 “Long Term Care Irony,” by Stephen A. Moses, Broker World, December 1, 2021 (PDF version.) “What works for long-term care and what doesn’t,” by Stephen A. Moses, McKnight’s LTC News, November 17, 2021. “What’s better for senior living and care — the market or government?,” by Stephen A. Moses, McKnight’s Senior Living, October 25, 2021. “Long-Term Care’s Problems Are Bad, Getting Worse, but Fixable,” by Stephen A. Moses, McKnight’s LTC News, October 1, 2021. “Should Medicaid Protect $8 Trillion from Private Senior Living Costs?” for McKnight’s Senior Living, August 9, 2021 “The InLTCgentsia” for Broker World’s August 2021 issue. (PDF version.) “Panel Gives States Pass in Collecting Assets for Medicaid Long-Term Care,” by Stephen A. Moses, Health Care News, July 2021 “Government Violates the Long Term Care Social Contract to Your Detriment, by Stephen A. Moses, Broker World, June 2021. (PDF version.) “President Biden, tear down this wall,” by Stephen A. Moses, McKnight’s LTC News, June 23, 2021 “Using Medicaid to protect inheritances,” by Steve Moses and Brian Blase, The Hill, June 10, 2021. “LTC financing: Be careful what you WISH for,” by Stephen A. Moses, McKnight’s Senior Living, June 7, 2021. “The
social contract for long-term care,” by Stephen Moses for McKnight’s
Long-Term Care News, May 17, 2021. *** LTC BULLET: LTC EPIPHANY LTC Comment: The following article will be published in Broker World magazine’s June 2022 issue. We thank editor and publisher Stephen Howard for permission to pre-publish the column here. We strongly recommend Broker World to anyone working in the financing or provider sides of the long-term care profession. Subscribe here; only $6 for a year. “LTC Epiphany” When I first studied the long-term care issue in 1982, I sized it up quickly. People were living longer and dying slower usually in welfare-financed nursing homes. The reason was easy to discern. Well-intentioned politicians made institutional long-term care available to anyone who couldn’t afford it otherwise. They called the program Medicaid and over time it caused virtually all of the problems long-term care faces today. By making nursing home care virtually free, Medicaid locked institutional bias into the long-term care system, crowded out private home care financing, and trapped the World War II generation in sterile, under-funded nursing facilities. By reimbursing nursing homes less than the cost of providing the care, Medicaid guaranteed that America’s long-term care service delivery system would have a shortage of qualified caregivers and suffer from serious access and quality problems. By providing care of dubious quality, Medicaid incentivized plaintiffs’ lawyers to launch giant tort liability lawsuits, extract massive financial penalties, and further undercut providers’ ability to offer quality care. By compelling impoverished citizens to spend down what little income and savings they possessed in order to qualify for long-term care benefits, Medicaid discouraged accumulation and growth of savings among the poor, reducing their incentives to improve their stations in life. By allowing affluent people to access subsidized long-term care benefits late in life, Medicaid encouraged accumulation and growth of savings among the rich who could pass their estates to their heirs whether they were stricken by high long-term care expenditures or not. Medicaid discriminated against the poor and favored the affluent by allowing people and families with extra “key” money to buy their way into the better nursing facilities, and by allowing planners to help affluent clients avoid the program’s reputedly poor care. By making public financing of expensive long-term care available after the insurable event occurred, Medicaid discouraged early and responsible long-term care planning and crowded out the market for private long-term care insurance. All these pieces in the long-term care puzzle were clear to me from the beginning. A solution immediately revealed itself. We had to get people to worry about and plan for long-term care earlier in life so they would not end up decades later in need of catastrophically expensive care with relying on Medicaid their path of least resistance. One way to do that was to force everyone to pay extra taxes to fund a new program that would, somehow be better than Medicaid. But using government compulsion repulsed me and besides the other programs of that kind we already had, Social Security and Medicare, were slipping toward inevitable insolvency. So I recommended a kind of long-term care social contract. We would continue allowing people with substantial income and assets to qualify for Medicaid long-term care benefits, but if they chose that route their largest resource, their homes, would be liened and recovery of the cost of their care mandatory from their estates. We got most of the LTC social contract into federal law with the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, but alas states didn’t implement it fully, the federal government didn’t enforce it, and the media didn’t publicize it. So the public remained blithely unaware and continued to ignore long-term care until they needed it, relying on Medicaid by default. So here I am in 2022, 40 years later, with a flash of insight, my LTC Epiphany. To fix long-term care once and for all, we have to move its risk and cost forward to a time in life when people are still young, healthy and affluent enough to qualify and afford responsible long-term care planning. But how can we get their attention to this critical issue when they have so many other things pressing on their minds and their pocketbooks. Who worries about long-term care when there are car, home and credit card payments to make, plus retirement and college savings? Answer, almost no one. Recent research has helped in this
regard, however, by showing that the long-term care financing problem is
not as big as we feared it was. For example: “an American turning 65 today
will incur $138,000 in future LTSS costs, which could be financed by
setting aside $70,000 today.” That does not sound so daunting. If we’re not going to use government to force people into another one-size-fits-all government program like the WA Cares Fund or the WISH Act, what can we do? We can learn from the critical mistake WA Cares made. Instead of starting with a bad government program and allowing people to opt out of it, begin with the opt out as the way to avoid government compulsion. Give people options to show they have met their individual responsibility to cover the LTC risk they bring into the risk pool. They can pony up $70,000 today earmarked for future LTC or show they have a plan in place to cover $138,000 of LTC costs later. How? Count the ways. Long-term care insurance could cover that risk. Earmarking a portion of home equity for long-term care would also work. A new kind of individual retirement account dedicated to LTC would be a third way. Or maybe a “deferred reverse estate annuity mortgage,” that is, a legally binding and officially recorded lien on one’s estate set aside for long-term care. There are probably many other ways people could formally and legally prove they have satisfied their individual share of long-term care risk and cost. All that would be needed is a private company or agency to certify that whatever the individual proposes actually does cover his or her share of the liability. Ah, but what if someone says no, I won’t do my part? Then and only then the government could step in by garnisheeing wages, reducing grants or withholding tax refunds to create a dedicated LTC account on the recalcitrant citizen’s behalf. Covering each individual’s contribution to the LTC risk pool will not fully offset the total LTC risk across society. Some people incur far more than the average risk and cost. But by transferring so much of the LTC risk to the private sector, the residual burden on public financing would be vastly reduced and manageable. With most people already covered for their share of the LTC risk, very few will remain dependent on public programs later on. So Medicaid, or whatever replaces it, could be a high quality provider of LTC services across the full spectrum of care paying private market rates thus raising the access to and quality of long-term care for everyone. Maybe long-term care is not the overwhelming challenge it has always been considered to be. Maybe all we have to do is reconceptualize the issue, remove the perverse incentives that discourage LTC planning, and enforce long-term care responsibility on the front end instead of rewarding irresponsibility on the back end as now. |